In general I thought that this second half of Berger’s book flowed much more smoothly in its arguments. Interestingly enough I found that I was not as clear cut about a “likes” and “dislikes” section. However, what I did find is that I began strongly agreeing with the base principles of Berger’s arguments but strongly disagreeing with concluding developments.
Firstly, Berger writes; “What remains sociologically essential is the recognition that all symbolic universes and all legitimations are human products; their existence has its base in the lives of concrete individuals, and has no empirical status apart from these lives” (p.128). This statement runs a deep truth with me, particularly when taken into the context of mental health. What you would call in your universe or “world” and consider legitimate may result in considering a patient’s legitimizations to be absurd. However, the fact of the matter is that they are symbolically and subjectively real to them and all the more to the point, have their roots set deeply into the individual themselves.
“What is most important for our considerations here is the fact that the individual not only takes on the roles and attitudes of others, but in the same process takes on their world” (p.132). I find this passage to resonate on a personal note with myself. I often have the revelation that I am acting out another person’s mannerisms. However, these are usually not just some random acquaintance. I can think of two (in my opinion equally likely) explanations. The first (would fit Berger’s liking) is that these people that have “rubbed off” on me are people that I have spent a great deal of time with and become socialized to the “culture” constructed between the group of people interacting with each other. The second is much more deeply seeded. I think that the first case may have some resonance in the short term while the members of that sub-group are still engaged with each other. However, I think that more longer lasting effects can be found by stating that these socialized mannerisms have been imparted to the individual by other persons whom the individual found to be admirable in some way or another. In short, the subconscious is paying a homage to the persons that the entity of the self has dubbed “influential” (most likely framed in the positive).
Moving in a linear fashion through the book, I also thought it was interesting that Berger makes mention of the ways in which different cultures view children. He mentions (p.136) that Western cultures often view children as “sweet” and “innocent” whereas some other cultures view them as “by nature sinful and unclean.” I have no opinion one way or another other than being able to confirm (from my viewpoint) the Western stance Berger presents. However, I did think it was worth some reflection and investigation.
Berger writes (p.141) that primary socialization cannot take place without an emotionally charged identification. On the other hand, secondary socialization does not require this. Berger uses the example that one is “required” to love one’s mother but not his teacher. Perhaps it is due to the time in which the book was written, but I certainly don’t think that this is an adequate example. One is not “required” (required by whom?) to “love” anyone… in fact, that seemingly defeats the entire purpose of a “gift” of love. At any rate, given the examples at hand I would have to disagree with Berger and say that his “primary” and “secondary” socializations may need to be reframed as “positive” and “negative” socializations; both influential societal auras that contribute to the development of a person’s “social-self.”
Berger states that the reality of our childhood is always regarded by the psyche as “home” (p.143) and that all other, later, realities are, by comparison, “artificial.” I find this to be hauntingly true. As Sartre put it, introspection is always in retrospect. Any self analysis of the “present” is always filtered through the lens of the past. We can’t help but compare our present situation to the days of old, particularly if we are fond of our former state/place. Berger later (p.160) discusses that what is required is a “radical reinterpretation of the meaning of these past events or persons in one’s biography.” I love stories, anthologies, and am a well known fan of postmodern-narrative therapy/psychology. So this rubbed a good vein with me. True enough, we may not be able to change the aforementioned “lens” but we can change where our focus lies, or add additional “lenses”, or recall that there are many pages left to be written in the metaphorical “biography.”
When Berger discusses “maximal success in socialization” (p.164) he seems to be advocating for his descriptions of “simple division of labor” and “minimal distribution of knowledge.” However, I must disagree. There is a reason Mayberry (The Andy Griffith Show) is a fictional place, and anyone not living under a rock for the last sixty years knows how socialism and communism have panned out on live scales. Yet, Berger states that men have committed treason to the self once they've been socialized (p.170). I agree with this part, at least when the socialization process becomes such that “the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts.” Such a proposition insists that there is nothing singularly significant about the individual and that it’s only purpose lies in being a function of the “whole.”
Nearing the conclusion of the book Berger writes; “Put simply, psychology always presupposes cosmology” (p.175). I feel as though I can’t quite bring myself to get on board with this assumption. Certainly, in some regards it is quite apparent. Extreme behaviorists and cognitivists may apply here with a reduction to neurology and nature, but I don’t think its quite the case of other models of psychology. Even more philosophical psychologies that are more concern themselves more with space, time, and freedom can’t all be cap-stoned with the causality aspect of cosmology. Particularly if a psychologist were to truly emphasize and embody a “here and now” or “future oriented” mindset all the rules of cosmology are little more than filler in an prologue.
Lastly, there are Berger’s concluding statements. “Man is biologically predestined to construct and to inhabit a world with others. This world becomes for him the dominant and definitive reality. Its limits are set by nature, but once constructed, this world acts back upon nature. In the dialectic between nature and the socially constructed world the human organism itself is transformed. In this same dialectic man produces reality and thereby produces himself” (p.183). The first part is crudely true. We are born, other people are born, we and other people inhabit the physical planet Earth. Berger gets a bit off track in the next statement because everything in the preceding chapters implies that hermeneutics are more quintessential than sociology and that “that world” “becomes reality” in very different ways. Indeed, man acts back against the world (Camus: There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn) and a transformation takes place discursive (rather than dialectic) living of life. Lastly, man does not “produce” himself by means of producing his reality, only manifests the embodiment of him(her)self. My ever existential side feels the need to advocate that existence precedes essence.
Reference:
Berger, P., Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the
sociology of knowledge. New York, New York. Anchor Books. p.116-183.
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